<
>
Download

Textanalyse
Philosophie

Universitat Pompeu Fabra UPF Barcelona

9/10, 2016,

Mathias S. ©
3.50

0.06 Mb
sternsternsternsternstern_0.2
ID# 65075







Epistemology – Professor Bonet

Induction

By

This paper will analyze induction and look at its conditions, Hume’s criticism and Poppers answer to these problems.

Induction

When looking at induction we first have to consider Aristotle’s approach to it. He described induction as a form of generalization with a bottom-up form of reasoning which first considers the individual and then makes inferences to the general. This concept does not have to start at the individual and is also valid for inferring from the general to the more general.

Aristotle based his approach on induction on the ontological notion of things.

To elucidate how induction works, the example of research of metal expanding under the impact of heat, was used: First you heat one piece of a certain metal and see it expanding. As this is an essential property of metal we do not have to repeat it, but we have to repeat the experiment with one piece of all other types of metal.

After discovering that they all expand we generalize that all metal expands under the influence of heat.

Induction was introduced to constitute an epistemological foundation for empirical sciences. It is necessary to define a method for discovering and justifying empirical laws which can withstand the most skeptical questioning and answers to rigorous reasoning to enable us to phrase generalizations drawn from the particular.

There are three conditions which have to be fulfilled to reach rigorous reasoning: First, a large number of observations is necessary. Second, each obtained observation has to obtain the same result. Third, observations have to be performed in all possible circumstances which might impact the result.


Another form of Inductive inferences is based on regularities which have been observed in the past and lead us to the belief or knowledge that this observation will continue in the future. Here, the example of the continuously rising sun fits well. However, induction based on regularities and expectation is an ambiguous concept and can be considered as vague in some part, also because it is not clear if the statement refers to knowledge or mere beliefs.

This discloses a hurdle for straight forward comparisons.

There are some classical philosophical problems connected to induction. First, the question for proof that universal laws obtained by induction are actually true. Second, proof that the principle of induction is true and third and last, questioning proof that regularities observed in the past will continue in the future.

These will be used as the introduction to Hume’s criticism.

Hume’s Deconstruction of Induction

David Hume criticizes induction in his book „A Treatise of Human Nature” (1738) and developed the induction problem. First, he criticizes the conditions of induction, namely the missing specification of a large number of observations necessary and the impossibility of knowing all possibly influencing circumstances on the results.

His main criticism covers our expectation that prior observed regularities will continue in the future, which he does not see as a proof but sees it as impossible to prove.


Logical deduction cannot prove that a universal law is true on the basis of empirical observations. Using empirical evidence to prove induction is a fallacy as it is the attempt to prove the principle of induction for universal laws with the principle of induction.

Russel stated that when there is no answer to this problem, there is no difference between sanity and insanity, except that the lunatic who believe he is a poached egg is in the minority. This illustrates the impact of Hume’s destruction of induction.

Popper’s response

Popper’s response “Conjectural Knowledge” (1971) starts with the commonsense problem, which he also calls “the bucket theory of the mind” and it goes along the lines of: “There is nothing in our intellect which has not entered it through the senses”. This view has to be challenged as certain beliefs and expectations like laws of nature might not follow this logic.

Karl Popper then divided Hume’s problem into two: the logical problem and the psychological problem.

The logical problem: Are we justified in reasoning from (repeated) instances of which we have experience to other instances (conclusions) of which we have no experience? Hume denies this, independent of the number of repetitions.

The psychological problem: Why, nevertheless, do all reasonable people expect, and believe, that instances of which they have no experience will conform to those of which they have experience? That is, why do we have expectation in which we have great confidence?

Hume answers this with “custom or habits”, meaning we are conditioned by observing repetitions and the mechanism of the association of ideas.

First of, Popper agrees with Hume that there is no valid induction logic and procedure. Popper’s approach is reformulating all subjective and psychological terms with objective terms. To solve both problems, he attempts to use the principle of transference: what is true in logic, must be true in psychology.

However, the answer still stays negative. Therefore, he replaces “is true” with “is true or that it is false”:

Can the claim that an explanatory universal theory is true or that it is false be justified by “empirical reasons”; that is, by assuming the truth of certain test statements or observation statements (which, it may be said are “based on experience”)?

This can be answered with yes, because the assumption of the truth of test statements enables us to refute an explanatory universal theory. So Popper sees the solution in exposing a theory to critical thinking and empirical testing with the intention to falsify and refute it, if this is not possible it can be regarded as a tentative acceptance of the theory.

Moreover, Popper adds another reformulation of the problem to include possible comparisons between theories: Can a preference with respect to truth of falsity, for some competing universal theories over others ever be justified by such “empirical reasons”? Which can be answered positively in some lucky instances and falsified in others.


| | | | |
Tausche dein Hausarbeiten