<
>
Download

Seminararbeit
Politik

NDU, Washington D.C., USA

2006

Peter V. ©
7.40

0.13 Mb
sternsternsternsternstern
ID# 39631







NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE


It doesn’t have to be lonely at the top -
Why the United States should revert to multilateral policies



von Roeder
Dipl.-Ing.
Colonel, German Air Force


Core Course 6200
WAR AND STATECRAFT
Professor
Dr. Mike Mazarr

Faculty Advisor
Dr. Gebhard Schweigler

October 11, 2006

The challenge

While it is obvious that a governable and stable world with a decisive and broadly accepted United Nations legal framework and with strong and efficient regional security organizations would be most desirable, reality tends to be different. To the contrary, many regions, especially in the broader Middle East and North Africa are extremely unstable. Some of their nations seem to be in a continuous state of interior or exterior war, rogue states threaten their neighbours and the international security, authoritarian governments suppress their own people, neglecting their basic needs and civil rights.

Failing, undemocratic, or weakly governed nations face economic collapse, corruption, social, ethnic, and religious tensions.

Many of the described conditions form a basis for the development of radical religious or political movements, and – even worse – are perfect breeding grounds and safe havens for terror groups. In addition, some of these states are still pursuing access to the technology and production capabilities for weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the ongoing proliferation of these technologies and the required knowledge cause grave international concern.

Global threats as climate change, pandemic diseases, and international terrorism cannot be countered by individual states.

Having accepted these truths, the question should be raised, what has been done, what needs to be done, or what needs to be done better by the international community in order to resolve some of these problems and diminish the risks to international security. This paper will address several of the difficulties encountered by the United States and her European Allies in aligning their fundamental perceptions, assessments, and beliefs, resulting in different views and ways on how to tackle the presented challenges.

It will then provide some thoughts on the main differences and consequences between the United States’ approach in Afghanistan vs. Iraq and the ensuing strategic divergence that for a long time seemed impossible to overcome. Drawing conclusions from these experiences, the paper will then offer some suggestions for decision- and policymakers on where to start the required ‘healing process’ for the urgently required, close relations.

Differing perceptions and approaches

It is still a common believe that both partners across the Atlantic share common cultures, values, and understanding. Notwithstanding, there are obvious differences in the perception of the threats, resulting in different ways and means, the partners prefer to resolve interstate differences. In order to determine some of the various root causes for the widespread tensions in the United States-European relationships during the last years, a short retrospect will be useful.

While there is common understanding that short term security threats by terrorist activities can only be tackled by actively pursuing and destroying the training camps, networks, and lines of communication, the majority of the other mentioned, global challenges is much more complex and will require long term commitments to find – and secure – reliable, robust, and durable solutions.

One popular approach to address these problems is, to promote democratic transformation in those countries. The rationale being that open, democratic societies and market economy, free elections, and the chance for the people to participate politically and socially will consistently re-solve many of the delineated sources of instability. The substantiation for this belief can probably be found in the US-European experiences after World War II, when the United States has success-fully proven in Europe that promoting democracy would inevitably lead to an enormous gain in regional stability, prosperity, and liberty.

As a result, security in Europe today is not any more based on a delicate balance of power, but on mutual trust and understanding, acknowledged inter-dependence, and common objectives. This goal has initially been reached by applying over-whelming military power to defeat the Nazi-Germany. Nevertheless, military force was soon to be followed by a comprehensive, long-term strategy for political, economical, and financial support for the war-burdened, European countries.

The reconstruction and nation building process, enabled by the Marshall Plan, that even included the former aggressor country Germany in 1949, was un-questionably a huge success for the United States strategy and is still remembered well today.

This success in the post-cold war era seems to be assessed as being transferable to today’s challenges, at least from the American perspective. However, even though this approach has worked well in Europe, some caution is advisable. There are enormous differences between Europe, where the roots and the spirit of democracy had been a part of the culture and thinking prior to the war1.

The cultures and religious foundations of most of the Middle East and some of the African countries however, are fundamentally different. Islam is neither ‘just’ a religion nor can it be restricted to private life, as western secular systems tend to do. In the ideal Islamic state, the political authority has to fulfil the divine message. While accepting that there are various different reactions to democratization in the Muslim communities, it is also clear that for some, Islam’s own mechanisms and institutions cannot include democracy.

These essential distinctions must be addressed and have to be considered when developing democratization strategies.

The Wilsonian element of the United States Security Policy

Immediately after coming to office in 2001, the George W. Bush administration’s unilateral approach to some of the most important international issues seemed to deny the need to deal with global issues on a multinational basis. Some U.S. decisions, like the uncompromising rejection of the International Criminal Court, or the categorical disavowal of the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Protection, raised concerns.

Even America’s closest allies and partners anxiously observed, how the new U.S. government would continue to deal with the role of having become the world’s only superpower. Additionally, the neoconservative ‘Wilsonians’ within the Bush administration stressed the importance of democratic transformations in the Middle East and other regions, but seemingly “dropped Wilson’s emphasis on international institutions.”2 For them, legitimacy seemed to be coming solely from their goal and focus on democracy, and did not any longer require international confirmation.

The Afghanistan Campaign - Multilateral Legitimacy

In the years following 9/11, the differences between the US and its European allies in strategic assessment, vision of the world order, and concepts how to counter the new magnitude of terrorist threats, became more and more evident. NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson’s suggested that NATO, “will continue to play a central role in these efforts.”4 However, in spite of NATO’s first-time invocation of Article 5 of its founding Charta, immediately after the atrocious attacks, the United States deliberately decided not to use the NATO command and control organi-sation for its campaign against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.

This decision has most probably been caused by American reservations about NATO’s effectiveness. The US assessment of NATO’s capabilities had been influenced by her experience with the Alliance’s 1999 air campaign in Kosovo. During that bombing campaign, in addition to the perceived weakness and inefficiency of European military forces, “micro-management and political judgement calls from several key NATO member governments” had an unconstructive impact and the “need for consensus among all 19 members of the Alliance…put additional constraints on the military decision-making process.”5 Consequently, the United States chose to build a ‘coalition of the willing’, and picked out those allied contributions that would best suite and complement its own capabilities and resources.

Cynical observers might argue that this choice already marked the beginning of the new, unilateral, and imperialist trend in United States politics and decision-making. A critical juridical examination might in fact suggest that the campaign was illegal in relation to international law, but (not only) in my opinion, it was at least legitimate.

Nevertheless, though not using NATO’s military framework, US Deputy Secretary of State Armitage asked the Allies for “rhetorical or political support,” “sharing of intelligence, sharing of financial information, perhaps overflight rights, etc.”6 In fact, although the US coalition building effort showed a somewhat exclusionary character, and the appointed command structure virtually bypassed the North Atlantic Council, the Afghanistan campaign enjoyed widespread international support and solid backing.

Consequently, the notion of self-defence could be extended to include action against a nation or state, harbouring terrorists, or providing them a safe haven. This might in part have been made possible by the change of international perception during the Bosnia crisis and war, when the international community, for the first time, attached more value to humanitarian issues and inner state conflict resolution than to the inviolability of sovereignty.

The multilateral support and the close coordination with NATO ensured broad participation of European Alliance members in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the International Stabilisation Assistance Force (ISAF), and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in the north. Further-more, with NATO taking command of the UN-mandated ISAF in 2003, there is a broad consensus among Alliance members that a failure in the peacekeeping and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan would indeed be detrimental to common security interests.

Thus, the nation building efforts have become a benchmark test for the Alliance’s ability to promote stability outside its borders. The reluctance of NATO to incorporate the US-mission in Afghanistan under one command, should not be overemphasized. The most important reason is the fear of complicating the deconfliction between combat and peace support operations, and seems reasonable.

Nonetheless, the European contribution relieves some of the stress and financial burden from the United States’ effort in Afghanistan.

Going beyond accepted norms of international law, or: It’s lonely at the top

While the scope of this paper does not allow an in depth discussion about the political, diplomatic, and tactical processes preceding the actual attack on Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, it can be said that gross errors have been made on both sides of the Atlantic. The European nations agreed with the American assessment that Saddam’s regime was in violation of international law and numerous UN resolutions.

Moreover, some European policymakers, especially the political leaders of France and Ger-many, contributed little to de-escalate the commencing political controversy, but instead used it for tactical advantages needed in domestic politics. Later, the United States President’s aggressive rhetoric about the ‘axis of evil’, together with the then newly published National Security Strategy (NSS) fuelled the ongoing dispute.

It became clear that the United States was willing – and planning – military strikes outside the accepted norms of international law, called ‘pre-emptive’ by the NSS, but being ‘preventive’ on second sight. The fundamental difference in the United States’ and European point of views, and the brusqueness of the dispute, might be best described by quoting Chris Patten, the EU commissioner in charge of Europe's international relations at the time.

In an interview with the Guardian, he stated, „When you're addressing that agenda, frankly, smart bombs have their place but smart development assistance seems to me even more significant". Questioned about Bush’ ‘axis of evil’, he remarked, "There is more to be said for trying to engage and to draw these societies into the international community than to cut them off."8

For the European nations, an alliance and unconditional loyalty are very different things. Brusqueness, or statements, like ‘either you are with us or you are against us’, were no good to alleviate the cooperation. The old saying ‘It is not what you say, but how you say it’ might best describe the European feeling towards the United States government at the time.

Additionally, the presumed and later apparently confirmed manipulation of intelligence data to support America’s line of reasoning for the war, as well as the perceived lack of proof for the correctness of US allegations against Hussein, consolidated this position.

Correspondingly, the United States’ unilateral campaign did not find major support among the ‘Old’ European nations, and the belief that the American decisions contradicted international law is still widely shared among the European population. The way in which the United States tried to persuade, yes even press the UN to agree on a resolution, legalizing her planned and already decided attack on Iraq, added numerous countries worldwide to the ever growing opposition and left her with the extremely large burden of having to wage and pay for the war almost by herself.

How to break the deadlock in the War on Terror

Assuming that the above-mentioned analysis of the 16 unrelated intelligence agencies and services is based on a thorough research, it would be negligent to dismiss it as easily as United States Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld did two weeks ago, by saying that intelligence could be “flat wrong.”10 This year’s revision of the NSS seems to acknowledge the fact that the military dimension has been overemphasized in its first version, and the resulting strategies have been too one-dimensional.

We do not need to go as far as Edward Allen, who assesses that „The pre-emption strategy – so radical in its dismissal of long-standing international norms against preven-tive wars – has not outlived the unresolved conflict in Iraq,” but considering the acknowledgement by the National Intelligence Estimate, he is probably right, when he concludes, that Iraq “has acted as a fertile recruiting and training ground for terrorists.” 11

The 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is a first step in the right direction. It clearly incorporates the deepened understanding of the terrorist threat and acknowledges the vast improvements in cooperation and collaboration already under way between the United States, NATO, and the EU all the way down to the working level. This is where the Europeans and the international institutions can get back into the game.

Kimberley L. Thachuk observes that, while the “United States is waging a war against terrorism,” Europeans “tend to characterize terrorists as criminals and to favour a law-enforcement strategy over a warfighting approach.”12 This is merely one example for the many differences in the perception of the threat. Nevertheless, despite the harsh tensions in the transatlantic relations, the United States (through her Atlantic Council) and the EU have cooperated effectively in the fight against terrorism.

As David L. Aaron and others point out, this cooperation is especially successful in areas like “law enforcement, border and transportation security, and terrorist financing.” The report concludes, “U.S.-EU cooperation…has been one of the success stories of transatlantic relations”13 Despite numerous disputes, the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Passenger Name Records (PNR) being the most prominent ones14, this success will have to be utilized to address other challenges.

Much has still to be done in areas like information sharing and privacy, law enforcement and judicial cooperation, or border and infrastructure security.15

Recent history has illustrated that an effective response to crises along the full spectrum of conflict requires at least three types of security forces: high-end combat forces to neutralize hostile, organized adversaries; constabulary or paramilitary forces to handle crowd control and lower levels of organized violence; and community-based law enforcement organizations (police, judicial, and penal authorities) to rebuild legal and judicial institutions.16

The Bush administration had underestimated and not taken into account the consequences of a complete breakdown of Iraq’s civil administration and security organisations, following the overthrow of Hussein’s dictatorial government. Consequently, and due to the lack of dedicated constabulary or paramilitary forces for the recent operations, the United States had – and still has – to use their elite Special Operations Forces (SOF) for stabilization and reconstruction missions.

These units are critical, high-value resources, and are trained and equipped for other, often maybe even more crucial missions. Inevitably, the SOF units have an extremely high operations tempo, and are continuously overstretched.

Their multinational, headquarters, based in Vicenza, Italy, is modular and mobile. In April 2006, it has conducted its second Command Post exercise (CPX). Within the framework of a comprehensive International Crisis Management under the aegis of the European Union, its task is to respond rapidly to such requirements. EUROGENDFOR is able to conduct operations within the whole spectrum of civil security actions, either on its own or in parallel with a military intervention, thus providing an effective, multinational tool.

The way ahead

These and other developments can guide the way ahead for the transatlantic partnership in an environment, where the differences between peace support and humanitarian tasks have become marginal. It would be advisable for NATO, the United States, and the EU, to continue to thoroughly analyze each other’s particular strengths and weaknesses. They will then certainly find more and more areas for successful cooperation, not necessarily limited to military affairs.

It will furthermore be worthwhile to leave behind the discussions about unfair burden sharing. A really viable transatlantic cooperation depends not only on mutual trust and understanding, but also on detailed knowledge about each other’s strengths and weaknesses. Only then will efficient and successful working relationships be created.

While the United States-European relations might still be somewhat strained, there are numerous signs for broad improvements. These have to be fostered in order for the United States not to be ‘lonely at the top’ anymore. The NSS of the United States, the NATO Action Plan against Terrorism, and the European Security Strategy do have differences, based on the different perceptions and preferred approaches to the terrorist threat, but overall they are similar documents, having a lot in common.

The collective aims should enable all partners to find common ways and means as well. These strategies do indeed contain a comprehensive list of measures to effectively fight terrorism. Some fine-tuning and minor adjustments to address and resolve the mentioned differences might have to be included but do not impair their usefulness or value.

It will also – and at times maybe even primarily – have to include non-military, diplomatic, economic, cultural, and other means, to find support and acceptance around the globe. The success will not only be measured in terms of the number of arrested terrorists or absence of terrorist attacks. How these goals are being achieved will be of equal or even greater importance.

A particularly important area, closely monitored from all over the world, will be the amount and the kind of domestic restrictions, and compromises of the democratic values, the western governments are willing to accept in the course of action.

There will be no well and truly protection against terrorist attacks. The Europeans are right in avoiding a ‘fortress Europe’, and instead in favouring the protection of individual liberty and civil rights. Unnecessarily exaggerated domestic security measures, as we have seen and still see in the United States, inflict damage on civil rights and reputation. Wire-tapping, unwarranted arrests, imprisonment of detainees without fair hearings, or the use of torture during questioning, are just some examples for measures to be avoided, if the creditability and acceptance of the United States and its Allies as global supporters of democracy and security is not to be endangered.18


| | | | |
Tausche dein Hausarbeiten