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Tourismus

Broward College Davie

Edward Smith

Sara G. ©
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The stock market for piracy is somewhat simple, members of the community contribute weapons, funding and soldiers, and receive a portion of the ransom money in return on their quest to hijack a variety of ships for ransom the profit of piracy. Somali refuges as far as Canada and the United States contribute money to the cause, in addition to financial backing from sources in Saudi Arabia, Dubai, Yemen and Al Qaeda.
Therefore what was once a disjointed group of Somalis reacting to illegal fishing and offshore waste dumping has turned into an organized and internationally funded operation.

A UN report based on interviews in Eyl constructed a rough example of how the profits are distributed: 30% to those involved in the hijacking, 10% to the ground militia who control the area, 10% to local community elders and officials, 20% to financiers and 30% to sponsors.
In addition, the family of any pirate killed in action receives significant compensation, and the first pirate to board the target ship usually gets a double share of the profits.
Interestingly, despite Al-Shabaab’s public disapproval of piracy, a Kenyan-based security consultant found that as much as 50% of pirate profits go towards the Islamic group’s military efforts.

Some policy solutions might persuade the shipping industry to alter its practices. The first is to force insurance companies to require ship owners to adopt safeguards. Insurance companies, although they have to pay out ransoms, can make considerable profits due to their ability to raise premiums for piracy.

The fact it is land-based, and a clear manifestation of organized crime means that it will be hard to control from the sea but perhaps no easier to control on land, even if the Somali state grew stronger.

We cannot offer many effective policy prescriptions that would have a dramatic effect on piracy in Somalia, but it is essential to be realistic about the prospects of ending such piracy. It is hard to imagine how the incentives for criminal business, the state, and other international players existing in a symbiotic relationship could be altered.

To have a noticeable impact, any policy prescription would have to find something else for pirates to do given how easy it is to become a pirate. Alternate employment would have to be accompanied by major disincentives for piracy, although providing a disincentive to an activity which has significant financial gain in a situation as desperate as Somalia will be difficult.

Violently pursuing organized criminals in other contexts has not been a successful strategy, but it is worth examining how other organized crime groups have been stopped or had their activities reduced. Piracy also has clear echoes of other types of international crime stemming from relatively ungoverned spaces, like the trade in opium in Afghanistan, and poses a similar set of obstacles.

Focusing clearly on the nature of piracy, and viewing it through the lens of crime, may reveal the best policy solutions possible.



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