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Politik

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This paper written for political science: international relations. It was given an A-

Michele M. ©
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The conflict between the United States and Iraq.

By all accounts, the reality of the American occupation and rebuilding of Iraq has diverted considerably from the idealistic vision that the occupiers held at the outset. Indeed, the American experience as an occupying force has been a disillusioning one. Through the course of their occupation the American strategists and forces alike have had to learn a lot of hard lessons about why their initial plans were wrong what they might need to do to amend it.

For the Iraqis, the experience has generally been one of considerable hardship and suffering. While there are similarities in the sense that both sides have experienced a heavy dose of confusion, frustration, and concern about the future course of Iraq, there are key differences as well. Foremost among these is the fact that, as the ones initiating the occupation, the Americans are in a position of responsibility while the Iraqis are much moreso in a position of rebellion and/or dependence.

The implications for the ongoing politics of the occupation and the future rebuilding of the Iraqi nation-state are that America will increasingly have to acknowledge that the course of occupation and rebuilding will depend on their ability to react and adjust to organically emerging Iraqi groupings and structures rather than imposing an external vision of what Iraq might look like.

The future strategic impact of the American endeavor in Iraq will depend largely on their ability to make this adjustment.

Looking first at the American experience in Iraq, there is no doubt that it has been one of disillusion and frustration. This is true for both the strategists and for the American troops on the ground. Colby’s Buzzell’s account of his experience as an American soldier exemplifies the outlook of the troops.[1] While Buzzell generally retains a sense that he and his comrades are “fighting the good fight” in Iraq, he by no means has confidence that the dictators of policy are giving America the best chance to meet its goals.

Either way, his gives book gives a strong sense for the experience of the infantryman on the ground. He writes of the hardship of spending nights sleeping outside in the cold and rain. He gives a strong sense of the confusion battle, showing how difficult it is for the soldier to make snap judgments about who is the enemy and who is an average Iraqi citizen.

Perhaps most of all, Buzzell gives an inside look at how the real battles on the ground differ from the reports that Americans receive from news outlets like CNN. On the one hand, he confirms that innocent Iraqi citizens are being killed in numbers higher than American leaders would like to admit. On the other hand, he conveys the degree to which this is not the fault of the American soldiers, but rather a by-product of the situation that they have been placed in.

As such, American soldiers must try to maintain their sense of morale and well-being while sorting through the emotions caused by losing comrades and, at the same time, the heavy burden of accidental killings of Iraqi citizens. This is certainly an element of disillusion for any soldier who came to Iraq hoping and expecting to be fighting productively for what is good and right in Iraq.

In many ways, the sense of disillusionment among American policy makers and strategists has been even more pronounced. This is demonstrated in various accounts offered by Chandrasekaran in his book Imperial Life in the Emerald City. An obvious example is the case of Paul Bremer. As Chandrasekaran notes, Bremer had come to Iraq with a seven-step plan for Iraqi sovereignty.

This plan had run aground somewhere around step four: the writing of an Iraqi constitution. Bremmer had envisioned a constitution “written by Iraqis for Iraqis.”[2] Once in Iraq, however, Bremer’s plan was complicated by the realization that an open election would likely lead to a constitution that did not reflect American goals or interests. His quest for a group of aptly selected appointees was complicated by the opposition of Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani’s insistence that the drafters be elected.

After initially assuming, or hoping that al-Sistani could be convinced to go along with the American plan, he found that this was not the case. It was around this time that Bremer’s seven-step plan began to lose viability and support, both on the ground in Iraq and from American advisors such as Colin Powell.[3] This typifies the American experience as being one of disillusionment and slow realization that plans made prior to having real knowledge and experience with the Iraqi situation would essentially be useless.

Another example of the frustration and disillusionment of the American experience is seen in the case of John Agresto, senior advisor for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Once in Iraq Agresto found himself scrambling to gain funds for the purpose had gone there for. He was disillusioned to find that $25 million that had been set aside by USAID for Iraqi universities had gone to American universities bidding to establish partnerships with Iraqi institutions.[4] Agresto was stunned to find, for example, that money had gone to the University of Hawaii’s College of Tropical Agriculture to advise the University of Mosul’s College of Agriculture.

Yet another instance of this was seen when Agresto, with little funding to achieve his biggest objectives, began to focus on encouraging academic freedom. With this goal in mind he worked for the establishment of an academic bill of rights for universities. This marked a direct challenge to Shiite student activists that had been threatening secular professors and women on campus.[7] Unfortunately, even though the document was passed and posted at universities, “it sounded good on paper but there were no resources to implement it.”[8] Once again, the best intentions and efforts of American strategists were virtually worthless due to an inability to acknowledge or overcome the realities of the Iraqi situation that they were operating within.

If the American experience in Iraq has been characterized by disillusionment, the Iraqi experience has been one of suffering and hardship. This is demonstrated in the account of Zaki Chehab which takes us inside the perspective of the Iraqis on the ground. Chehab provides numerous accounts of coalition actions that directly alienated the Iraqi people, thereby increasing the virulence of the opposition.

In continuing his analysis, Chehab points out that groups such as the Kurds, Sunnis and Shia have all experienced the occupation differently in some ways based on their unique histories. Certainly the Kurds were the most receptive to the American intervention, considering their history of suffering at the hands of Saddam Hussein.

The Sunnis, on the other hand, were likely the least receptive to the American intervention based on their expectation that they would be ones held responsible for the Hussein regime. Therefore they were concerned that the American invasion would amount to an effort to “shame” them for Hussein’s Sunni regime.[11] While the Shia, on the other hand, were happy to see Hussein overturned, and therefore less reflexively anti-occupation, American clashes with the Shia leader Muqtada Al Sadr soon alienated the Shia and led them to become involved in their own form of resistance as well.[12]

This same report also emphasizes that the “destructive legacy” of ongoing conflicts from 1980 onwards, as well as the sanctions against Iraq after 1990, are only making the situation all the more difficult.[14] Even more recently, reports have been emerging of a massive refugee crisis as people flee Iraq for other countries in the region.[15] This report indicates that “overall living standards have declined sharply” during the American occupation.[16] This has left Iraqis with the difficult choice between risking their lives due to violence at home or picking up and leaving for uncertain futures in other locations.

As this indicates, the Iraqi experience with the occupation has been one of pronounced suffering and hardship.

Also, both sides seem to have a lack of understanding of the goals and perspectives of the other side. American soldiers have experienced the loss of loved ones and considerable hardships (certainly in comparison to their accustomed life style) while the Iraqi people have experienced more than their share of losses and hardships themselves. Both sides live with the constant threat of violence.

It is this common element, more than anything else, that each side has in common over the span of the American occupation.

On the other hand, differences between the experiences of the two sides can be noted as well. For the Americans, the experience has been one of living with the consequences of the many mistakes that they have made. As Colin Powell is rumored to have once told George W. Bush about Iraq, “if you break it, you own it.” This is precisely what has happened, and ownership of Iraq has brought more than its share of difficulties.

Certainly there are many Iraqis who are taking action to impact the occupation one way or another. This applies both to those who are working with the Americans and those who are fighting against them. There is no doubt that many Iraqis are ready to deal with the Americans and help them to resolve key issues. Even these people, however, are dependent on the ability of the Americans to acknowledge local developments and adjust to them accordingly.

Indeed, it is this process of adjustment that seems to be emerging, however slowly and painfully, from the experience of the occupation thus far on both sides. The combination of American disillusionment and Iraqi reversion to sectarian groupings in response to the conditions they face has forced the Americans to face the futility of their initial plans and assumptions.

This is supported Gareth Stansfield’s report on “Accepting Realities in Iraq.”[17] Stansfield lists a number of emerging realities that are currently shaping the landscape of the occupation. The first of these realities is that Iraq has currently reverted to regional power bases based on local sectarian and tribal groupings.

As Stansfield writes, “The regionalization of Iraqi political life needs to be recognized as a defining feature of Iraq’s political structure.”[18] From this it follows that there is not “a civil war” in Iraq but many such conflicts between sects fighting for power. Next, Stansfield notes that these conflicts have been “internalized” by Iraqis and that social cohesion has totally broken down.[19] To make matters worse, Stansfield also notes that major neighboring states such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have an interest in maintaining instability and will continue to encourage it in their own ways.

These current harsh realities need to be

accepted if new strategies are to have any

chance of preventing the failure and collapse

of Iraq. A political solution will require

engagement with organizations possessing

popular legitimacy and needs to be an Iraqi

accommodation, rather than a regional or

US-imposed approach.[20]


Indeed, due to the nature of the American experience in Iraq and the reaction of the Iraqi people, the future of the occupation of the Iraqi nation-state and the rebuilding of Iraq will hinge on the effectiveness of the US in meeting this challenge that Stansfield has expressed.

Thus, in addressing the question of what direction the occupation heading in, an important question becomes the outcome of the upcoming presidential elections. Regardless of which party wins, it seems inevitable that America will have to make some adjustments to emerging realities on the ground in Iraq. However, one could speculate that such adjustments would be made more readily by a democratic president than by a republican.

Liberated from the original rigid Bush blueprint, a democratic leader might be more willing and able to abandon unrealistic objectives and strategies, leaving them on the trash heap of the Bush policy, and forge ahead in new directions.

At the same time, a leader of either party will face one key road block in terms of the task of developing a viable Iraqi security force. Indeed, in the estimation of James Fallows, this question holds the key to the success of the American project in Iraq.[21] Considering Buzzell’s account of Iraqi policemen running away from dangerous situations without putting up a fight (followed by American soldiers being instructed not to relate this occurrence to the media), the situation here does not look promising.[22] Indeed, the great difficulty of this task implies that there will be no decisive answer or “victory” for America in terms of realizing its ultimate goal of a secure, pro-Western Iraqi government.

While this may not achieve an acceptable resolution of the problems of the occupation, it will considerably improve the experience of the occupation and rebuilding process for Americans and Iraqis alike.

Works Cited

Buzzell, Colby. My War. New York: Berkley Caliber, 2005.

“Civilians Without Protection: The Ever-Worsening Humanitarian

Crisis in Iraq.” International Committee of the Red Cross, April 2007.

Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. Imperial Life in the Emerald City.

New York: Vintage Books, 2006.

Chehab, Zaki. Inside the Resistance: Reports from Iraq’s Danger

Zone. New York: Nation Books, 2005.

Fallows, James. Blind into Baghdad: America’s War in Iraq.

New York: Vintage Books, 2006.

Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: A Deepening

Humanitarian Crisis?” CRS Report for Congress, 23 March,

2007.

Stansfield, Gareth. “Accepting Realities in Iraq.” Middle East

Programme Briefing Paper, May 2007.


Adjusting to Emerging Realities:

Disillusionment, Hardship and the American Occupation of Iraq



[1] Colby Buzzell, My War (New York: Berkley Caliber, 2005).

[2] Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), 211.

[3] Ibid, 217.

[4] Ibid, 318 .

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid, 320.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Zaki Chehab, Inside the Resistance (New York: Nation Books, 2005), 130.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid, 138.

[12] Ibid.

[13] International Committee of the Red Cross, “Civilians Without Protection: The Ever-Worsening Humanitarian Crisis in Iraq,” April 2007.

[15] Rhoda Margesson, Jeremy M. Sharp, Andorra Bruno, “Iraqi Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: A Deepening Humanitarian Crisis?” Congressional Research Service Report RL 33936, 23 March 2007.

[16] Ibid, 1.

[17] Gareth Stansfield, “Accepting Realities in Iraq,” Middle East Programme Briefing Paper, May 2007.

[18] Ibid, 1.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid.

[21] James Fallows, Blind into Baghdad (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), 148.

[22] Buzzell, 138.

[23] Buzzell, 145.


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